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Abstract
How do companies and government interactions affect business groups’ decisions on growth? So far, empirical evidence is based on qualitative
data that do not explain how political strategies affect the expansion or diversification of business groups. Our main contribution is to discuss the
conditions that affect their growth. To do this, we conducted an in-depth field study in six business groups, and examined 17 growth decisions. Four
categories (origin of growth, historical relationships, business group’s scope and use of specific political strategies) emerged from the analysis,
based on interviews with managers and on 480 secondary data sources. We further applied the qualitative comparative method to test our categories
as conditions for growth. We found that a historical relationship between the group and the government is a necessary but insufficient condition
for growth through diversification. To foresee diversification, historical relationship must be aligned with government’s political interest, or with
the use of one or a combination of specific political tactics. We found no set of variables that can fully explain growth through expansion.
© 2017 Departamento de Administração, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade da Universidade de São Paulo – FEA/USP.
Published by Elsevier Editora Ltda. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Keywords: Business groups; Political strategy; Diversification

Resumo
Como as interações entre as firmas e governo afetam as decisões de crescimento dos business groups? Evidências empíricas existentes não explicam
como as estratégias políticas afetam a expansão ou diversificação dos business groups. A principal contribuição é discutir as condições que afetam
o crescimento dos business groups. Para responder isso foi realizado um estudo de campo em profundidade em seis grupos empresariais e foi
analisado 17 exemplos de crescimento desses seis business groups. Quatro categorias emergiram a partir das entrevistas com diretores e presidentes
e 480 fontes de dados secundários (categorias: origem de crescimento, relacionamento histórico, escopo do business group e estratégia política
específica). Foi aplicado o método QCA para testar as categorias como sendo condições para o crescimento. Descobrimos que ter uma relação
histórica entre o grupo empresarial e o governo é uma condição necessária, mas não suficiente para o crescimento grupo empresarial por meio
da diversificação. Para prever a diversificação, a relação histórica deve ser somada com o interesse político governamental ou com o uso de um
ou uma combinação de táticas políticas específicas da firma. Não foi encontrado nenhum conjunto de variáveis que possa explicar plenamente o
crescimento via expansão.
© 2017 Departamento de Administração, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade da Universidade de São Paulo – FEA/USP.
Publicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. Este é um artigo Open Access sob uma licença CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Palavras-chave: Grupos empresariais; Estratégia política; Diversificação
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Introduction
A business group is an organizational model in which a
set of legally independent firms are held together through a
stable relationship, operating strategically in different sectors
and under common control and ownership (Colpan & Hikino,
2010; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). Authors
that tried to explain why organizations grow as a group have
approached the topic from several theoretical perspectives (Yiu,
Lu, Bruton, & Hoskisson, 2007). The mainstream theory – based
on transaction costs (Williamson, 1975, 1981) – argues that
growth is necessary to expand groups’ internal markets, and
consequently, to reduce their transaction costs. However, the
political economy approach (Aoki, 2001; Khanna & Fisman,
2004; Schneider, 2009; Yiu et al., 2007) offers another explanation for growth. According to this perspective, business groups
diversify and expand as a result of their use by governments for
promoting public policies. Therefore, the business group option
is a strategic fit to government requirements (Yiu et al., 2007),
and a means to open or expand new sectors and markets that
serve both parties.
However, explanations proposed to date under the political
perspective have largely overlooked the conditions that underlie the growth of different types of business groups (Schneider,
2009). Explanations that consider the business group to be an
economic tool per se (Khanna & Fisman, 2004) focus on the
state’s actions and their impact on group performance. As a
result, there is still a limited number of studies on business
groups that provide empirical evidence as to the role played
by corporate political strategies in achieving diversification and
expansion, among other conditions.
We contribute to this issue by showing that in the majority of diversification cases, business groups have a historical
relationship with the government. However, this condition is
insufficient; if business groups want to diversify, they need to use
one or a combination of the following political tactics: long-term
cooperation contracts, lobbying, personal relationships, joint
venture with a state-owned firm, or a shareholding agreement
with the government. On the other hand, when a business group
has a historical relationship with the government, which wants
to develop a specific sector, it provides stimulus and support to
the group, to encourage and enable diversification, without the
need of a specific political tactics. Therefore, we propose the following research question: How do companies and government
interactions affect the growth decisions of business groups?
There are two dimensions of growth: (i) expansion – opening
of new plants, launching of new products and engaging in internationalization (Ansoff, 1965; Donato & Rosa, 2005; Kumar,
Gaur, & Pattnaik, 2012); and (ii) diversification – entering or
exiting new economic sectors or industries (Ansoff, 1965). Our
analysis is oriented to diversification because it is the main feature of business groups (Yiu et al., 2007), while expansions are
considered as counterfactual.
We tracked 17 examples of business groups’ growth in order
to report how it occurred, how relationships between government
and groups were formed, and how eventual corporate political

strategies were used, regarding these growth events. Our empirical strategy was to perform an in-depth qualitative research,
by conducting 16 interviews with top-level managers, from six
intentionally chosen Brazilian business groups and also with
industry experts. Additionally, we went through hundreds of secondary sources to deal with such a sensitive issue, as suggested
by Rama (2011), including news media, business groups’ annual
reports, government data available in official sites, and books
about business groups’ history and their directors’ careers. From
these sources, we created a description of each event, codified all
data and compiled them using the software ATLAS.ti, to build
empirical oriented categories that could represent the conditions
that underlay the growth of business groups. Finally, we applied
Qualitative Comparative Analysis – QCA (Ragin, 1987) to our
categories, in order to assess multiple conjectural causations,
vis-à-vis a case-sensitive approach (Fiss, 2011; Rihoux, 2006;
Rihoux, Álamos-Concha, Bol, Marx, & Rezsöhazy, 2013).
Literature review
The growth of business groups
A business group organizational format is defined as a group
of formally independent firms that operate in multiple sectors,
which may or may not be related, and are under the common
control of a family or people who have personal, trust-based
relationships with each other (Chang & Hong, 2000; Colpan
& Hikino, 2010; Granovetter, 1994; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007;
Leff, 1978). Such groups are present in several countries and
receive different names: “chaebol” in South Korea, “Keiretsu”
in Japan, “economic groups” in Latin America, “the twenty two
families” (Granovetter, 1994) in Pakistan, “oligarchs” in Russia,
and “QiyeJituan” (Lee & Kang, 2010) in China.
Although business groups once dominated the companies’
landscape of North America (Kandel, Kosenko, Morck, & Yafeh,
2013), nowadays they are increasingly present in emerging countries, especially in response to market failures typical of such
economies (Khanna & Palepu, 1997), and because of the high
levels of state intervention (Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014).
There are six possible perspectives to address this subject.
The mainstream theory is the Transaction Cost Economics
(Williamson, 1981); the others are Sociology (Granovetter,
1994), Resourced-Based View (Guillén, 2000), Agency Theory
(Yiu et al., 2013), Network Theory (Granovetter, 1983) and the
Political Strategy Perspective. We include this last one because
historically political issues had a strong influence on business
groups’ development, not only in Brazil but in South Korea,
Italy, China and India (Aldrighi & Postali, 2010; Bresser-Pereira,
2009; Mukhopadhyay & Chakrabortyb, 2017).
Few groups were large and diversified when founded.
Growth through expansion and diversification was and still is
the fundamental business group strategy (Bhatia & Thakur,
2017; Hernández-Trasobaresa & Galve-Górriz, 2017; Khanna
& Yafeh, 2005; Schneider, 2009). Political and policy issues
mostly explain the distinct sizes of business groups in different
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countries. Diversification, on the other hand, is the result of decisions to seek economies of scope and to reduce risk exposure
by holding subsidiaries with different market cycles (Schneider,
2009). Choosing growth as a strategic objective may be the result
of political connections. In most cases, and especially in developing countries, political motivations influence business groups,
making diversification more likely (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998;
Schneider, 2009; Yiu et al., 2007).
Business groups can grow by exploring markets and activities
that may or not be related to the economic sector in which they
operate (Chang & Hong, 2000; Colpan & Hikino, 2010; Granovetter, 1994; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007; Leff, 1978). A business
group might, for example, grow into a new sector with no previous operation (Purkayastha & Lahiri, 2016), diversifying from
livestock to construction; or it could seek growth within a sector
where it is already present, expanding from cattle slaughtering to
leather processing. Literature suggests that the decision to pursue growth in related or unrelated sectors is highly influenced
by government actions (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Schneider,
2009).
The political economy approach emphasizes the relationship
between government policy and the growth decisions of business
groups (Schneider, 1998, 2009). Evans (1995), Wade (1990),
and Amsden (1989) argue that government plays a central role
in modeling firms’ growth and investment paths, by influencing
and inducing businessmen to make investments that concern the
government, through the offer of selective subsidies and protection against foreign competition. In doing so, the group is
used as a tool for accomplishing government’s political and
economic goals (Yiu et al., 2007). Moreover, the presence of
highly diversified business groups in a country’s economic scenario is a useful way to promote public policies and industrial
development (Khanna & Fisman, 2004).
Government choices can enable or constrain the operation of
groups. Incentives can range from direct promotion, by enabling
a specific group to enter a sector of interest to the government,
to indirect promotion, such as incentives for a whole sector,
through tax benefits and tariff protection (Schneider, 2009). The
limits can be the regulation of joint ventures and control over
multinationals’ growth.
There is historical evidence on the influence of governments
on business groups (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). One example,
among others (Amatori, 1997; Guriev & Rachinsky, 2005;
Khanna & Yafeh, 2007; Maman, 2002; Schneider, 2009), are
the Japanese keiretsu groups that emerged after the war as a
result of a government privatization program, and have expanded
and diversified their activities in response to government contracts granted under special conditions (Shimotani, 1997). There
were also periods in which governments have hampered business
groups rather than helped them. In Chile, during Pinochet’s term,
policies toward free market and anti-concentration of property
s were adopted in 1973; in China, when the communist party
gained power in 1943, the result was hostility between government and business groups. Despite some negative periods
throughout history, in general relationships between government
and business groups have stimulated the economic development
of distinct sectors simultaneously (Colpan & Hikino, 2010).
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Interaction of business groups with government
Governments have enough power to influence firms’ strategic
choices, operations and processes (Pearce, 2001), but business
groups are not passive elements in this context. Therefore, there
is an interdependence and an ongoing exchange between groups’
actions and government policies (Salisbury, 1969). Business
groups employ a variety of means to anticipate and influence
government decisions, to achieve their credibility and enhance
their reputations, in order to achieve better performance and
competitive advantages (Bonardi, 2011).
The classification found in the literature specifies political strategies that involve the creation of political connections
(Fisman, 2001), and the tactics that firms use to accomplish them
(Hillman & Hitt, 1999). These strategies and tactics include:
(i) an informational strategy achieved through lobbying or
commissioned research projects; (ii) a financial incentive strategy, implemented through contributions to political campaigns,
politicians and/or parties, and paying for travel or personal services (Bandeira-de-Mello & Marcon, 2011; Claessens, Feijen,
& Laeven, 2008); (iii) a constituency-building strategy, accomplished through public relations or advocacy advertising; (iv) a
strategy for building personal relations, implemented, for example, by hiring politicians for the board of directors (Faccio,
2006); and (v) the tactics of businessmen participating in public
life, which can be used to influence legislation, get privileged
information, and even influence government spending toward
their companies.
Firms use a combination of resources to build their political strategies, to differentiate themselves and succeed (Bonardi,
2011; Sojli & Tham, 2017; Tian, Hafsi, & Wu, 2007). In general,
they use their growth to have access to politicians and to legislative and regulatory processes (Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Bierman,
1999) and to receive preferential treatment (Faccio, 2006) and
easy access to funding (Claessens et al., 2008). Political connections play an important role in the world’s largest economies
(Fisman, 2001) and are present in firm-government relationships
in all countries (Faccio, 2006; Sojli & Tham, 2017). However,
political connections are most influential in emerging markets,
where the role of institutions is not fully developed, corruption
is more latent, and there are some restrictions to foreign investments (Faccio, 2006; Fisman, 2001; Li, He, Lan, & Yiu, 2011).
The way by which groups are formed facilitates the use of political connections to favor some of their affiliated firms together
(Bandeira-de-Mello, Marcon, Goldszmidt, & Zambaldi, 2012).
Many studies show that groups which have political connections enjoy greater benefits than those that do not (Claessens
et al., 2008; Faccio & Lang, 2002; Fisman, 2001; Sojli & Tham,
2017). These benefits include access to funding, lower taxes
and fees, and power over market regulation. Other studies show
that political connections are linked to firms’ diversification into
different sectors, and these connections depend on institutional
issues. For example, a study of Chinese corporations showed
that political connections influenced non-related diversification
by firms in that country (Li et al., 2011). Results of an empirical
research on Brazil show that politicians guarantee the growth of
business groups (Costa, Bandeira-de-Mello, & Marcon, 2013).
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According to a 2003 study conducted by the Inter-American
Development Bank, Latin America is more volatile regarding
politics than Europe or Asia, and as a result of this weakness
business groups are offered greater incentives to grow in sectors of interest to the government (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998;
Schneider, 2009).
To go beyond existing empirical contributions that show how
business groups can benefit from political connections, the gap
that we address, in the political economy perspective, is a deeper
investigation on the set of conditions that underlie the two types
of business groups’ growth – expansion and diversification.
These conditions and the relationship between them are analyzed
together.
Research design
We chose Brazil as the research setting for the following
reasons: (a) the country provides an appropriate scenario for
this study because government is a relevant shareholder of
business groups (Schneider, 2009; Xavier, Marcon, & Bandeirade-Mello, 2013); (b) government plays a role either as a majority
or a minority shareholder; (c) it also takes part through stakes
held by pension funds of state-controlled companies; (d) the relationship between companies and government is a phenomenon
rooted in the national culture (Aldrighi & Postali, 2010); and (e)
this relationship is seen as a normal state of affairs.
We chose qualitative methodology because the objective of
the study was to analyze in detail the conditions that enable
the growth of business groups. We compiled a list of business
groups that fit the following criteria: (i) groups listed on the
Brazilian Stock Market (BM&FBOVESPA) in 2011; and (ii)
groups included in a yearbook published by newspaper Valor
Econômico that lists the 200 largest groups that do business in
Brazil, along with their subsidiaries.1 Groups that met these criteria (n = 65) were classified using Schneider’s (2009) typology
of diversification, based on a measure of diversification variation (the Herfindahl Hirschman Index), and two classifications of
political connections, namely the presence of ex-politicians on
the board, as used by Camilo, Marcon, and Bandeira-de-Mello
(2012), and corporate campaign donations, as used by Costa
et al. (2013). Our sample of six groups that agreed to participate
in the research comprises business groups that are highly diversified and have made campaign donations. In compliance with
a confidentiality agreement, letters replaced the names of these
groups.2
The unit of analysis was the growth event, considered in two
dimensions: (i) expansion, through the opening of new plants,

1 “200 Maiores Grandes Grupos, Valor”, available at: http://www.revistavalor.
com.br/home.aspx?pub=19&edicao=9.
2 In order to guarantee the necessary confidentiality, preserving the anonymity
of the interviewees and their groups, a non-disclosure agreement was signed
between Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) and all Business Groups. As such,
all interviewee’s names and their respective groups or entities were hidden as
much as possible. We employed a system of codes to allow the relationships
between individuals, groups, and the diversification or expansion events to be
established.

new products and overseas expansion (Ansoff, 1965; Donato &
Rosa, 2005; Kumar et al., 2012); and (ii) diversification, as the
entry or exit of one of the business groups’ companies in new
economic sectors (Ansoff, 1965). Seventeen incidents of diversification or expansion were found and described. The study
is based on both primary and secondary data. To ensure validity and reliability, three rules were followed when collecting
and organizing data: (i) the use of several sources of evidence
for each diversification or expansion event, enabling data triangulation (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2005); (ii) adherence to the
historical sequence of facts in order to accurately describe what
has occurred; and (iii) creation of a database and a description
for each diversification or expansion event.3
One of the sources of evidence were interviews with representatives of business groups and specialists in the subject. Table 2
lists the 16 interviewees, with brief descriptions of their jobs
and careers up to the meeting date. We used a semi-structured
script for defining the questions, and the average duration of
the interviews was one hour. The process began in June 2013
and lasted until November 2013. We conducted 16 interviews,
nine of which were with members of the boards of the six business groups, or their employees working in the Institutional
Relations area, and seven with specialists. These professionals are relevant to the analysis either because they work for the
government, or are consultants in governmental relations, or expoliticians in the federal government, or former employees of the
National Bank of Social and Economic Development (BNDES).
Table 1 presents the list of interviewees and Table 2 the interview
guide.
We used a large number and a wide variety of secondary data
sources to validate data collected in the interviews (Rama, 2011).
The sources of secondary data were: (i) official documentation
about the groups, since their creation up to the present; (ii) published studies and evaluations dealing with the business groups
(Costa et al., 2013; Xavier et al., 2013); (iii) newspaper articles
and stories published in the media; (iv) economic and market
studies and videos; (vi) data from the official websites of the
Brazilian Senate and the House of Representatives; (vii) data
from the Superintendence for the Development of the Northeast
(SUDENE) and BNDES websites; (viii) quantitative data used
in a study by Costa et al. (2013), to capture diversification and
political campaign donations; and (ix) quantitative data used by
Camilo et al. (2012) to capture the presence of politicians in
groups’ boards. A total of 480 documents from 13 sources were
used as secondary data.
We performed a three-stage data analysis. The first step was
to describe each individual incident of the group’s growth –
diversifications and expansions, using primary and secondary
data. During this first analysis, Atlas.ti software proved invaluable for organizing and encoding the data and making notes for
each event. In the second stage, our main categories of analysis (Table 3) emerged with a view for comparing the cases

3 In all examples, a capital letter indicates that the criterion exists/is met, while
a lower case letter indicates that the criterion is not present/is not met.
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Table 1
Details of interviews.
Interviewee code

Date

Experience

INT 1
INT 2
INT 3

June/13
July/13
August/13

INT 4

July/13

INT 5
INT 6

August/13
August/13

INT 7
INT 8

September/13
August/13

INT 9

August/13

INT 10
INT 11

August/13
August/13

INT 12
INT 13

September/13
September/13

INT 14
INT 15
INT 16

October/13
October/13
November/13

Manager of relationship with investors, has worked for business group B for 10 years.
International director, works directly with CEO, 10 years in this position. Group B.
Managing director and marketing director of business group A. Responsible for institutional relations and
institutional demands. Four years in this position.
Institutional relations manager. Three years in this position; responsible for the development of this area
in Group C.
Institutional relations manager. Two years in this position and six years working in the group. Group F.
Director of institutional relations. 15 years of experience in this area. Has worked for the group for six
years. Group F.
CEO of the group’s holding company. 10 years working in Group E.
Institutional relations director. Has worked for the group for 15 years, and in this position for one year.
Group D.
Director of a consulting firm that works for big companies, as a bridge between public banks and
companies.
Has worked for 40 years in the government as institutional relations specialist.
Institutional relations specialist. Has worked for 10 years with multinationals and business groups,
associations, and the government, as a facilitator in public policy matters.
Owner of a public relations consulting firm for seven years.
Worked for many years in the federal government. Currently, president of an economic consulting firm
and member of directors’ board of several business groups.
Consultant. Former employee of a public financing institution. Has been in this institution for three years.
Works as director of the main subsidiary of a business group, responsible for government relations.
Chairman of the Board of Directors and entrepreneur. Worked for more than 30 years in one business
group, is currently in another.

Notes: Interviewees INT 1 through INT 8, INT 13, INT 15 and INT 16 are all representatives of business groups; INT 9 through INT 14 are all industry experts. INT
13 is both.
Table 2
Interview guide.
Questions
1. What is the structure of the business group?
2. How do business groups’ firms compete in their industries?
3. How is the decision making process in a new business?
4. Could you give us examples of investments that have increased or
decreased business group’s diversification?
5. Could you give us examples of the group’s institutional relations?
6. Which are the main activities of institutional relations with the
government?
7. Could you give us examples of investments in new industries, in which
the institutional relationship with the government has helped or
embarrassed the investment decision?

not fulfill specific conditions and outcomes. Table 3 also lists
the data codes.
We employed the crisp sets analysis procedure described by
Longest and Vaisey (2008). Fourth section presents the results
of the study.
Results
Our findings are presented across two sections. In the first,
we describe the 17 growth events of the business groups. In the
second section, we describe the QCA analysis, showing the sets
of conditions used by business groups to achieve diversification
or expansion.
Description of growth events

(Eisenhardt, 1989). Finally, we used QCA method as a means to
relate the empirical categories to the outcome of interest (Fiss,
2007). We chose QCA (Ragin, 1987) to guide our analysis for
a number of reasons, such as: (i) QCA allows the use of a small
number of cases to accomplish objectives, which includes testing the necessary and sufficient conditions of specific situations
(Ragin, 2006); (ii) the methods used in QCA research employ
the principles of logic to compare cases; (iii) QCA is appropriate
for analyzing models that involve many interacting factors, to
test hypotheses that predict if multiple conditions will operate
together (Longest & Vaisey, 2008). As such, QCA can address
situations in which an outcome has multiple causes. We used
the statistical program Stata 12.0 and the fuzzy package for set
manipulation (Longest & Vaisey, 2008) to perform QCA analysis. We used crisp sets (0/1) to define which cases did or did

The descriptions of groups’ growth through government
incentives and groups’ political strategies are based on extensive analysis of interviews and secondary data. When a single
group had experienced more than one diversification or expansion event, we isolated each event as a single unit of analysis.
Interviewees described groups’ political strategies for each unit
of analysis, explaining how their groups operated in each specific situation. Furthermore, we also searched for secondary data
that could provide relevant additional facts for understanding the
nature of the relationships between groups and government.
In some events, a group started a process of diversification
or expansion, whose origin was a governmental action that set
up incentives for the group to grow. For example, growth event
3, a diversification, was the entry of group B into the energy
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Table 3
Sets, definitions, encoding of conditions and outcomes.
Condition/outcome sets

Definition

Encoding

Growth strategy (outcome symbol: Y)
Y: Diversification
Y: Expansion

Diversification: entry into new sectors
Expansion: portfolio expansion, new product development,
internationalization, plant expansion
(Ansoff, 1965; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Donato & Rosa,
2005; Kumar et al., 2012; Schneider, 2009)
The origin of the diversification or expansion situation:
government or business group

1:Diversification
0: Expansion

Origin of growth (condition symbol: O)
O: Government
o: Business Group
Historical relationship with government
(condition symbol: R)
R: Present
r: Absent
Business group diversification (condition
symbol: N)
N: >6 sectors
n: ≤6 sectors
Specific political tactics (condition symbol: P)
P: Present
p: Absent

1: Government
0: Business Group

The historical influence of the government on group’s
development (Bonelli, 1998; Bresser-Pereira, 2009;
Caldeira, 2012; Queiroz, 1972; Schneider, 2009)

1: Historical relationship present
0: Historical relationship absent

Number of sectors in which the group has businesses
(Xavier et al., 2013)

1: more than six sectors
0: six sectors or fewer

Long term cooperation contract; purchase agreement;
lobbying; personal relationship; commissioned research
projects; contributions to politicians or party; paid travel or
personal service; public relations or advocacy
advertisement; corporate donations to political campaigns;
hiring politicians for the board; participation of
businessmen in public life; joint venture with state-owned
company; shareholding agreement with the government
(Guillén, 2000; Hoskisson, Johnson, Tihanyi, & White,
2005; Johnson & Amsden, 2001; Kock, Guillén, & Hall,
2001; Schneider, 2009)

1: Use of specific tactics to achieve political
strategies
0: Absence of specific tactics to achieve political
strategies

sector. Group B used financial incentives as political strategy
(Hillman & Hitt, 1999) – for example, campaign donations
and personal services and the information strategy (Hillman &
Hitt, 1999) – ex-politician on the group’s board. Group B has
a strong historical relationship with the government and is the
largest group in the sample. Prior to growth event 3, it already
operated in the agribusiness, textiles, logistics, construction,
real-estate developments and finance sectors. In 2001, Brazilian economy recorded a lower growth than expected, due to
electricity rationing, and that same year government chose this
group as the only beneficiary of the Priority Program for Thermoelectricity (PPT), which guaranteed access to natural gas at
low prices for 20 years. As such, this diversification originated in
the government. In addition, the group also received warranties
that energy generated by their plants would be purchased by the
government for that same period.
Another example is the expansion of a plant in the Northeast
of Brazil, that belongs to group C. The group used the political
strategy of financial incentives, which included campaign donations and hiring personal services. The decision to expand in the
Northeast was taken because the family that controlled the group
had real estate investments in the region and a close and longstanding relationship with the local government, which aroused
interest in developing an industrial plant. Hence, this growth
event originated in the group. In 2008, a long-term cooperation
agreement was signed with the local government, which set out
plans to improve industry development in the region. The group
made direct contact with three local State Secretaries: Trade
and Industry, Treasury and Environment, and Public Security.

In 2010, a cheap credit line from BNDES (Program for Investment’s Sustainability) was approved, giving access to R$ 2.7
billion. Additionally, the state where the factory was located
was SUDENE’s territory and, as such, industries in that region
were entitled to a fiscal incentive of 74% exemption of income
tax, along with another exemption known as Addition to Freight
for the Renovation of Merchant Navy (AFRMM).
Table 4 describes the 17 diversification or expansion events,
including the political strategies used by the business groups
involved, and the set of conditions that accompanied growth.
Analyzing business groups’ growth
We first built the best-fit model for group observations with
the current conditions, using all possible combinations. As
shown in Table 5, the best fit was found with the Y set (diversification vs. expansion). Data reveal that two groups were most
common. Group one (RNOp), with five observations, presents
the following combination of conditions: historical relationship
with government: present (R); number of sectors: greater than
six (N); origin of growth: government (O); and specific tactics
to achieve political strategy: absent (p). Group two (rnoP), also
with five observations, has the opposite configuration, where
relationship, sector and origin were all absent (rno), but the use
of specific tactics to accomplish political strategy was present
(P).
The following step in data analysis sought to provide a sense
of the overlap between outcomes and the set of conditions
(Longest & Vaisey, 2008, p. 93). This was achieved using two

Table 4
Description of growth events of business groups.
Group

A

Political strategies often employed

Events

Description of diversification or
expansion

Set of conditions linked to growth

(1) Agriculture, forestry, logging; (2)
trade; (3) parts and accessories for
motor vehicles; (4) financial
intermediation and insurance; (5)
transportation, storage, and postal
services; (6) other services

Financial incentive strategy:
campaign donation; personal services

(1) Reforestation sector

Origin of this diversification was a
government initiative to develop the
region through tax incentives. Group
A was the first group to diversify in
this region

Origin: Government; Number of
sectors: 6; Specific political tactics:
absent; Historical relationship:
absent.

(2) Seaport

Business group started this
diversification due to the need to
export timber. In 2009 group asked
for government support in the form
of a long-term cooperation.
Project was financed by a public
pension fund – PREVI, with cheap
credit. Group received R$ 750
million in support from the federal
government. Moreover, local
government backed the project by
improving local infrastructure.
Group has a strong historical
relationship with government. It is
the largest group in the sample. In
2001, Brazilian economy had grown
less than expected due to electricity
rationing. Due to a personal
relationship, group diversified into
the energy sector. Government
originated this diversification, by
choosing the group for a program to
stimulate electricity generation,
which gave the group access to
natural gas for 20 years, at low prices.
The origin of this diversification was
the group’s interest for growing.
Entry in the U.S. market took place
through a partnership with a local
manufacturer. The group was
supported in this effort by cheap
credit from BNDES-Exim, which
provided U$ 40 million for a
distribution center in that country.
Business group participates in
Brazil-USA CEOs’ forum, which
facilitated relationships and business
development in that country.

(1) Textile; (2) clothes and
accessories; (3) agriculture, forestry,
and logging; (4) electricity and gas;
(5) construction; (6) real-estate
services; (7) financial intermediation
and insurance; (8) services to
companies

Financial incentive strategy:
campaign donation; personal
services; information strategy:
ex-politician on group’s board

(3) Energy sector

(9) Internationalization of the textile
sector and entry into retail

rnOp
Origin: business group;
Number of sectors: 6; specific
political tactics: long-term
cooperation contract; historical
relationship: absent.
rnoP

Origin government;
Number of sectors: 8; specific
political tactics: absent; historical
relationship: present.
RNOp
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B

Sectors of activities

Origin: business group; number of
sectors: 8; specific political tactics:
lobbying; historical relationship:
present
RNoP
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Table 4
(Continued)
Group Sectors of activities

Political strategies often employed

Description of diversification or expansion

Set of conditions linked to growth

(14) Factory in the Northeast of
Brazil

The origin of this diversification was the
group’s owner, and his business partner was
a congressman. They asked for SUDENE’s
support to build the factory. In 1967,
SUDENE and Minas Gerais Development
Bank (BDMG) granted a loan of U$ 22.5
million of the 30 million needed
The government, through BNDES, was the
origin of this expansion. The group had
personal relationships with politicians. In
1983, BNDES invited the group to take over
the assets of a company that had gone
bankrupt. This expansion was supported by
SUDENE, BDMG and Northeast tax
incentives.
The origin of this diversification was the
local government. The governor of one of
the states in the Northeast of Brazil donated
land to the group in an inner city of the state
to build the new factory.

Origin: business group;
Number of sectors: 8 sectors; specific
political tactics: lobbying and
personal relationship; historical
relationship: present

(15) Factory in the Northeast of
Brazil

(16) Clothing and accessories

C

(1) Energy and gas; (2) pulp and
paper; (3) financial intermediation
and insurance; (4) chemical; (5)
transportation, storage, and postal
services; and (6) services to business

Financial Incentive Strategy:
campaign donation; personal
services;

(4) Energy sector

(5) Chemical sector

(12) Cellulose pulp factory in the
Northeast of Brazil

One of the largest groups in the sample.
Origin of this diversification was the group’s
interest in the energy sector. The group
signed a long-term cooperation agreement
with the government, and received
investments and tax benefits.
The origin of this diversification was the
federal government. Group had a partnership
with other companies of the sector and
BNDESPar, in a project to create an
industrial pole in the Southeast of Brazil.
Another group, controlled by the federal
government, offered R$ 2.7 billion to buy the
group’s chemical arm (valued at R$ 1
billion) and got it
The origin of this expansion was the group,
which developed a relationship with federal
and local governments to stimulate growth.
There were family relationships between
firm and state government, and a long-term
contract was signed; state government
offered special conditions for building the
factory in the state

RNoP
Origin: government; number of
sectors: 8; specific political tactics:
absent; historical relationship:
present
RNOp

Origin: government; number of
sectors: 8; specific political tactics:
absent; historical relationship:
present
RNOp
Origin: business group; number of
sectors: 6; specific political tactics:
long-term cooperation contract;
historical relationship: present
Rnop
Origin: government; number of
sectors: 6; specific political tactics:
absent; historical relationship:
present
RnOp

Origin: business group; number of
sectors: 6; specific political tactics:
lobbying; personal relationship;
long-term contract; historical
relationship: present
RnoP
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Events

Table 4
(Continued)
Group

(1) Rubber and plastic; (2) parts and
accessories for motor vehicles; (3)
trade; (4) maintenance and repair of
machinery; (5) chemicals; and (6)
trucks and buses

Political strategies often employed

Financial incentive strategy:
campaign donation; personal services

Events

Description of diversification or
expansion

Set of conditions linked to growth

(11) Pulp factory in the Northeast of
Brazil

A joint venture with BNDES. The
origin of this expansion event was the
business group; BNDES holds 27%
of the preferential shares in one of
the group companies; a long-term
contract was signed with state
government, which offered special
conditions for building the factory in
the state. This expansion received
federal tax incentives with a 75%
exemption of income tax
The origin of this diversification was
the group, which opened a bank to
finance its final customers. In order
to get credit approval from BNDES,
the group started to act as a direct
representative of the bank in the
market.
The origin of this expansion was the
group’s interest in
internationalization. Group
approached federal government
through an industry association, thus
developing a relationship, which led
to financial support from BNDES.
The origin of this expansion was the
group. It developed a relationship
with the federal government, through
an industry association and a
personal relationship, which lobbied
the government to convince it t to
acquire a customized product for
serving the rural population. Group
was supported by BNDES, which
financed the program, and received
tax incentives and exemptions.
Business group, one of the largest in
our sample, has a strong historical
relationship with the government.
Group entered the satellite industry
through a joint venture with a
state-owned firm. The origin of this
diversification was the federal
government’s National Program for
Space Activities, through a direct
request for a project that developed a
geostationary satellite.

Origin: business group; number of
sectors: 6; specific political tactics:
shareholding agreement with
government; long-term contract;
personal relationship; historical
relationship: present

(6) Financial sector

(8) Internationalization to Egypt

(10) Portfolio product

E

(1) Machinery and equipment,
including maintenance and repairs;
(2) trade; (3) transport; (4) financial
intermediation and insurance; (5)
information services; (6) services to
businesses; (7) repair and
maintenance services; and (8)
electronic material and
communication equipment

Financial incentive strategy:
campaign donation; personal
services; information strategy:
ex-politician on the group’s board

(7) Electronic and communication
equipment

RnoP

Origin: business group; number of
sectors: 6; specific political tactics:
joint-venture with state-owned firm;
long-term contract; historical
relationship: absent
rnoP
Origin: business group; number of
sectors: 6; specific political tactics:
lobbying; historical relationship:
absent
rnoP
Origin: business group; number of
sectors: 6; specific political tactics:
lobbying; personal relationship;
historical relationship: absent
rnoP
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D

Sectors of activities

Origin: government; number of
sectors: 8; specific political tactics:
joint-venture with state-owned firm;
historical relationship: present
RNOP
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Table 4
(Continued)

F

Sectors of activities

(1) Perfumery, hygiene, and
cleaning; (2) transport; (3)
information services; and (4)
agriculture, forestry, and extractive

Political strategies often employed

Information strategy: lobbying

Events

Description of diversification or
expansion

Set of conditions linked to growth

(17) Equipment and machinery

Business group entered the
submarine sector through partnership
with a small Brazilian enterprise with
expertise in nuclear generation of
electricity. This enabled the group to
participate in a Brazilian Navy
project. The origin of this
diversification was the government.
The origin of this expansion was the
business group. It approached federal
and local governments, built
relationships with politicians to
enable the project, and developed
public policies in the region; received
tax exemption and benefits, along
with permits from environmental
authorities. Through a long-term
contract, the group got tax reductions
for all of the factories’ products.

Origin: government; number of
sectors: 8; specific political tactics:
absent historical relationship: present

(16) Expansion: increased product
portfolio through the opening of two
factories in the North of Brazil

RNOp

Origin: business group; number of
sectors: 4; specific political tactics:
lobbying; long-term contract;
historical relationship: absent
rnoP
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Table 5
Best fit for Y set.
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Table 8
Final reduction sets – coverage and consistency.

Best fit

Freq.

Percent

Cum.

Solution

Set

Raw coverage

Unique coverage

Solution Consistency

RNOp
RNoP
RnOp
RnoP
rnOp
rnoP

5
2
1
3
1
5

29.41
11.76
5.88
17.65
5.88
29.41

29.41
41.18
47.06
64.71
70.59
100.00

1
2
3
4

n*o*P
n*O*p
R*o*P
R*O*p

0.364
0.182
0.273
0.364

0.273
0.091
0.182
0.273

0.500
1.000
0.600
0.667

Total

17

100.00

Notes: Capital letters indicate that the attribute is present and lower case letters
indicate its absence. R, historical relationship with government; N, group active
in more than six sectors; O, growth event originated in government; P, use of
specific political tactics.
Table 6
Coincidence matrix.

Y
R
N
O
P

Y

R

N

O

P

1.000
0.467
0.385
0.385
0.400

1.000
0.636
0.500
0.312

1.000
0.556
0.133

1.000
0.000

1.000

Notes: Capital letters indicate that the characteristic is present and lower case
letters indicate its absence. Y, growth through diversification; R, historical relationship with government; N, group active in more than six sectors; O, growth
event originated by government; P, use of specific political tactics.
Table 7
Sufficiency and necessity matrix.

Y
R
N
O
P

Y

R

N

O

P

1.000
0.636
0.714
0.714
0.600

0.636
1.000
1.000
0.857
0.500

0.455
0.636
1.000
0.714
0.200

0.455
0.545
0.714
1.000
0.000

0.545
0.455
0.286
0.000
1.000

Notes: Y, growth through diversification; R, historical relationship with government; N, group active in more than six sectors; O, growth event originated in
government; P, use of specific political tactics.

matrices: a coincidence matrix and a sufficiency and necessity
matrix. As can be observed in Table 6, the highest degree of
overlap was between a historical relationship with government
and involvement in more than six sectors, with coverage of 64%.
The sufficiency and necessity matrix (Table 7) shows which
single set is most likely to predict another single set. By focusing on the outcome Y (diversification), we observed that two
sets have equal scores (0.714). Specifically, groups active in
more than six business sectors (N) and situations in which the
origin of growth was the government (O) indicate diversification. With regard to the relationships between condition sets,
we noted that a number of sectors greater than six is capable of
entirely predicting a historical relationship with the government
(1.000).
We tested the sufficiency of all observed configurations of R,
N, O and P against our outcome (Y). We interpreted test results
in accordance with the premises set out by Ragin, who stated

Total coverage = 1.000/solution consistency = 0.647.
Notes: R, historical relationship with government; n, group active in 6 sectors or
fewer; o, growth event originated by business group; O, growth event originated
by government; P, use of specific political tactics; p, no use of specific political
tactics.

that “consistency scores should be as close to 1.0 (perfect consistency) as possible. With observed consistency scores below 0.75,
it becomes increasingly difficult on substantive grounds to maintain that a subset relation exists” (Ragin, 2006, p. 293). Three of
the tests (Y-Consistency against N-Consistency, Y-Consistency
against All Other Y-Consistency, and Y-Consistency against Set
Value) returned consistency levels equal to 0.600, for solutions
with more than two observations. This is an average result for
consistency in our model.
Longest and Vaisey (2008) propose that the subsequent step
is to verify common solutions and reduce them to a short logical
recipe. For our data, the “common” command returned the following list of combinations: rnoP, rnOp, RnoP, RnOp, RNoP
and, RNOp.4 We then used the “reduce” command to achieve a
reduced final solution set and its accompanying coverage statistics (Longest & Vaisey, 2008). Table 8 shows the output of this
process.
As shown in Table 8, results exhibit medium solution consistency for four minimum configuration sets. We can extract some
logical statements from the final four solutions. When growth
originated in the government, the absence of specific tactics
to achieve political strategies was always part of the solution.
In contrast, when growth originated in the group, the presence of specific tactics to achieve political strategies was always
observed. This reverse overlap shows that origin of growth and
use of a specific political strategy are empirically incompatible
conditions for diversification, according to our data. Although
one or other of these combinations (o*P and O*p) appear in all
solutions, they, alone, could not predict Y. Each of them was
observed twice, in combination with a number of sectors less
than or equal to six, and presence of relationship with the government. Finally, it is possible to state, in logical terms, that o*P
and O*p are necessary but insufficient conditions to generate
Y, since they must be combined with either n or R to result in
growth through diversification.
In the next section we discuss some of the theoretical contributions that can be drawn from our analysis.

4

The following theoretically possible logical combinations were excluded
because they did not occur in any of the empirical observations: “rnop”, “rnOP”,
“rNop”, “rNoP”, “rNOp”, “Rnop”, “Rnop”, “RnOP”, “RNop” and “RNOP”.
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Discussion
Despite the growing interest in the role that political strategies
play in business groups’ growth, we do not yet know which conditions underlie different types of growth (Schneider, 2009). In
our study data shows the existence of historical relationship with
government, origin of growth (whether initiated in the group or
in the government), degree of business group diversification, in
terms of number of different sectors, and use of a political strategy as conditions that may be necessary or sufficient for growth
through diversification into new markets, with the expansion of
existing operations as counterfactual.
The first and third solutions seem to extend ideas related to
the antecedents proposed by Hillman, Keim, and Schuler (2004),
regarding growth via diversification; these authors proposed that
the higher the firm’s level of diversification, more likely the
firm will use an on-going relational approach to corporate political activity. The use of specific tactics for political strategy,
combined with the decision to grow originating in the group,
rather than in the government, is another important contribution aligned with existing literature. Business groups diversify
because they want to become large enough to exert influence
on governmental actions (Schneider, 2009). If a business group
intends to grow, but does not use specific tactics for political
strategy, it will be more difficult to diversify, and harder to
influence government actions. The tactics for achieving political strategy that we have mentioned in this paper are already
known (Baron, 1995; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hillman et al., 2004;
Oliver & Holzinger, 2008); but the contribution of this research
is to demonstrate that the use of specific tactics to achieve political strategies leads to business groups’ diversification, if they
are taken together with other conditions, such as the government
not being the origin of growth, and the group keeping a historical
relationship with the government.
Despite difficulties that hamper the measurement of direct
effects of political strategy, because it has a complex set of variables (Hillman et al., 2004), we were able to identify some
important tactics used to achieve business groups’ diversification. For example, in event 9 the political strategy tactics
was lobbying. Used in combination with the political strategies commonly employed by the group – the financial incentive
strategy (campaign donations and personal services), the information strategy, and the strategy of building personal relations,
by appointing ex-politicians to the group’s board (Hillman &
Hitt, 1999) – it proved possible to diversify. Another example
was event 14, in which the tactics for political strategies were
lobbying and personal relationships, which, combined with the
same other strategies mentioned above, enabled diversification.
Based on solution 4, it is reasonable to assume that governments will select business groups whose relationship strategy
rests on long-term ties of trust. These trusted partners will help
them implement public policies, compensate for market failures (Khanna & Palepu, 1997) and achieve their political goals
(Yiu et al., 2007). At the same time, in exchange, the business
group wants to have access to subsidies and protection against
foreign competition (Evans, 1995; Wade, 1990), while increasing its sales and profits. Moreover, the historical relationship

between business groups and government in Brazil is accepted
as a phenomenon rooted in national culture (Aldrighi & Postali,
2010; Bonelli, 1998), for which there is plenty of evidence in
the history of Brazilian business groups. According to 2007 data,
of the 29 largest Brazilian business groups 18 were founded in
the 1960s. From this set, 14 began as state-owned companies,
and nine of them had since been privatized (Aldrighi & Postali,
2010).
Solution 2 highlights the fact that if governments initiate
actions, it is unnecessary for a business group to employ any
specific political tactics, even when the group has a low level
of diversification. Diversification event 5, described in Table 4,
is an example of this set of conditions that generate the outcome explained above. In our view, it is plausible to say that
the government chooses a business group to enter new sectors, giving less priority to market leaders. Literature states that
emerging economies’ environment stimulates not only diversification of small business groups, but also unrelated diversification
(Guillén, 2000). While literature suggests that governments
influence the growth of business groups (Schneider, 2009), it
addresses the subject generically. We help to fill this gap by
explaining how it takes place, suggesting that business groups
that have a historical relationship with the government usually
rely on governmental actions to ensure diversification.
Conclusion
This research contributes to studies of political strategy and
business groups (Bandeira-de-Mello & Marcon, 2011; Costa
et al., 2013; Queiroz, 1972; Schneider, 2009; Xavier et al., 2013),
by providing an explanation and an empirical demonstration of
the conditions that underlie the growth of groups. We found that
there is a necessary set of conditions for growth through diversification. First, a historical relationship between the business
group and the government is an important condition for growth.
In addition, it can be combined with specific tactics of political
strategies or with government initiative to support the business
group’s growth via diversification. Future research should use
the categories that emerged in this paper as conditions, and test
them in different contexts, in order to verify if they also explain
the growth of business groups.
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